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BANISHING HABEAS JURISDICTION: WHY FEDERAL 
COURTS LACK JURISDICTION TO HEAR TRIBAL 
BANISHMENT ACTIONS 
Mary Swift 
Abstract: The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA or “the Act”) of 1968 grants members of 
federally recognized Indian tribes individual civil rights similar to those enumerated in the 
federal Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Act provides only one 
explicit federal remedy for violations of the rights secured therein: the writ of habeas corpus. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to read an implied cause of action into the Act. Some 
federal courts assert habeas jurisdiction to review tribal banishment actions alleged to violate 
ICRA, but not over disenrollment actions. Tribal banishment means an individual tribal 
member is cast out from tribal lands and often removed from tribal membership rolls. Tribal 
disenrollment means an individual tribal member is removed from tribal membership rolls 
and often denied access to some or all tribal facilities. This Comment argues that federal 
courts should not assert habeas jurisdiction over tribal banishment actions because: (1) 
exercising habeas jurisdiction over tribal banishment actions contravenes federal Indian law 
canons of construction; (2) expansive habeas jurisdiction disturbs the careful balance struck 
by Congress and the Court between individual rights and tribal sovereignty; (3) declining 
jurisdiction protects tribes’ sovereign authority to determine their own membership; and (4) 
the line between banishment and disenrollment is arbitrary because tribes have authority to 
exclude nonmembers from tribal lands. Though it may leave a few individual tribal members 
without a remedy to challenge tribal banishment alleged to violate ICRA, such a uniform rule 
best protects tribal sovereignty, preserves congressional intent, and promotes robust tribal 
court systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself as a federal court judge in a region where the local 
Indian tribe has struggled for decades to retain tribal sovereignty and 
preserve cultural unity in the face of powerful state governments, loss of 
territory, and erosion of tribal traditions. A member of that local tribe is 
a repeat criminal offender and is the primary supplier of illicit drugs on 
the tribe’s reservation. The tribal court has convicted and imprisoned the 
individual numerous times, but federal authorities refuse to get involved 
for the more serious drug offenses.1 Exasperated and left with few 
                                                     
1. Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over major crimes committed in “Indian Country.” 
See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining “Indian Country” as Indian reservations, communities, and 
allotments); 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (describing “major crimes” committed by an Indian against 
another Indian over which federal courts have jurisdiction, including murder, manslaughter, assault 
with a dangerous weapon, arson, and burglary, among others). Tribes do not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978), but 
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options, the tribal council moves to banish the individual. Banishment 
will mean the individual is cast out from tribal lands and removed from 
the tribe’s membership rolls.2 After a full hearing before the tribal 
council and an option to appeal to the tribal court, the individual is 
banished from tribal lands. The tribal member now appears before your 
court on a writ of habeas corpus,3 alleging that the banishment 
constitutes unlawful detention under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA 
or “the Act”).4 If you side with the tribe and deny the writ of habeas 
corpus, it means that the banished individual has no further remedy. But 
if you agree with the banished tribal member and grant the writ of 
habeas corpus, you risk undermining the tribe’s sovereignty by 
interposing a federal court in matters of tribal membership. This issue is 
one federal courts have struggled with in recent decades as a result of 
increased tribal banishment and limited federal jurisdiction over ICRA 
violations. 
In 1968, after years of hearings, Congress enacted ICRA to provide 
substantive civil rights—similar to those protected by the Bill of Rights 
and Fourteenth Amendment—to tribal members.5 Though ICRA 
championed individual rights typical of the Civil Rights Era, it also 
reflected Congress’s attempt to increase tribal sovereignty. While the 
Act requires tribes to recognize substantive rights for tribal members,6 
only one federal court procedure is available to remedy ICRA violations: 
the writ of habeas corpus.7 ICRA’s habeas provision, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, 
provides: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available 
to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his 
detention by order of an Indian tribe.”8 Habeas is a limited remedy, 
                                                     
they do have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. See Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 
1892, 1892–93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)) (overturning Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 
(1990), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians, see infra note 113). 
2. See sources cited infra notes 19, 20, 23 (tribal banishment codes, as well as newspaper articles 
and cases addressing tribal banishment). 
3. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006) (habeas provision allowing individuals to challenge in federal 
court their tribal detention alleged to violate the Indian Civil Rights Act). 
4. Id. 
5. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–1303 (2006)). 
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to find 
any implied federal cause of action for ICRA violations, making the narrow habeas provision the 
sole method of redress in federal courts for ICRA violations. 436 U.S. 49, 69–70 (1978).  
8. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. 
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available only when there are “severe restraints on individual liberty,”9 
whether physical custody or another immediate restraint like parole.10 
In the seminal 1996 case of Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca 
Indians,11 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that 
permanent tribal banishment is a severe enough restraint on liberty to 
warrant habeas jurisdiction under ICRA.12 Two years later, the Second 
Circuit limited Poodry, finding that tribal disenrollment was not a severe 
enough restraint on liberty to warrant the exercise of habeas 
jurisdiction.13 The Second Circuit’s finding of habeas jurisdiction for 
banishment but not disenrollment informed similar lower court cases 
that followed.14 No other federal circuit court of appeals considered the 
banishment/disenrollment issue again until the Ninth Circuit in 2010. 
Adopting the Second Circuit’s reasoning, the Ninth Circuit declined to 
exercise habeas jurisdiction over a tribal disenrollment action,15 despite 
an impassioned dissent advocating for jurisdiction.16 
Banishment is an ancient punishment used by tribes to preserve order 
and rehabilitate tribal members.17 Historically, tribal members who 
committed grievous crimes like murder would be cast out of the tribe for 
a period of time to reflect on their actions.18 Such banishments helped 
maintain tribal cohesion, essential to cultural identity and protection.19 In 
                                                     
9. Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). 
10. Id.; Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). Other immediate restraints the U.S. 
Supreme Court has found to be severe enough for habeas jurisdiction include parole, Jones, 371 
U.S. at 243, and being released on one’s own recognizance pending a criminal appeal, Hensley, 411 
U.S. at 351.  
11. 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996). 
12. Id. at 880. This Comment addresses only the exercise of habeas jurisdiction—the merits of a 
habeas claim are beyond of the scope of this Comment. Federal courts must find jurisdiction before 
reviewing a habeas claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)–(c) (2006). In particular, an 
individual must be in custody or detained for a federal court to exercise habeas jurisdiction. See 
infra Part IV (discussing habeas custody requirement).  
13. Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). 
14. See, e.g., Sweet v. Hinzman (Sweet I), 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Quair 
v. Sisco (Quair I), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 964 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
15. Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3327. 
16. Id. at 921–22 (Wilken, J., dissenting). 
17. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1103 (2007); accord 
Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. 
L. REV. 85, 88 (2007). 
18. Michael Cousins, Aboriginal Justice: A Haudenosaunee Approach, in JUSTICE AS HEALING: 
INDIGENOUS WAYS 141, 154–55 (Wanda D. McCaslin ed., 2005) (“Banishment rarely occurs for 
life, and individuals often return home after a prescribed period of exile. They are allowed to remain 
if they have fully embraced the principles of peace and unity.”). 
19. Id.; Riley, supra note 17, at 1103 (discussing the necessity of tribal community for survival). 
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the past two decades, tribes have begun using banishment again to 
combat drug abuse and crime ravaging tribal communities.20 Until 
recently, tribes could only imprison individuals for up to one year,21 so 
often banishment has been used as a last resort against repeat 
offenders.22 Unfortunately, some tribes also use banishment as a 
retaliatory measure against members who speak out against the tribal 
government.23 Banishment today most often includes permanent 
expulsion from tribal lands and loss of tribal citizenship.24 Due to the 
harsh consequences of banishment and its reemergence as a sanction 
from tribal courts, tribal members have been challenging their 
banishment in federal courts under ICRA’s habeas provision.25 
                                                     
Tribes still use banishment to maintain order and cohesion. See, e.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND 
ORDER CODE § 3-2-4(a) (2010), available at 
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/colvillecode/title_3_2.pdf (permitting banishment when a tribal 
member “substantially threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, institutional 
process, economic security or health or welfare” of the tribe); NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-3(a), 
available at http://www.nezperce.org/~code/pdf%20convert%20files/Code_master_27sep11.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2011) (permitting banishment when an individual “unlawfully threatens the 
peace, health, safety, morals or general welfare of the tribe”). 
20. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey, Plagued by Drugs, Tribes Revive Ancient Penalty, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 1; Renee Ruble, Banishment Laws Revived Among Indians; Some 
Native Tribes Are Renewing Practice to Help Deal with Gangs and Drugs, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 
2004, at A9; see also Kunesh, supra note 17, at 88 (“Hindered by their limited civil and criminal 
jurisdiction, frustrated with their inability to impose meaningful sanctions, and fearful of further 
disruption, harm, and violence to their communities, tribal governments recognize that the old 
customs of banishment and exclusion are powerful and effective means of reestablishing order and 
safety in their communities.” (footnotes omitted)).  
21. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006)); see also 
infra notes 75–79 (discussing limitations on amount of time tribes may imprison tribal members). 
But see Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat 2279 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D), (b) (Supp. 
IV 2010)) (increasing maximum sentence permitted under ICRA to three years for any one offense 
for repeat offenders and up to nine years of stackable sentences). 
22. See Kershaw & Davey, supra note 20 (“While the Lummi use banishment to root out drug 
dealers, other tribes, like the Chippewa of Grand Portage, Minn., are using it to rid the reservation 
of the worst troublemakers and to preserve what they say is a shared set of core values.”).  
23. See, e.g., Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 876–78 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Sweet v. Hinzman (Sweet I), 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198–99 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Lynda V. Mapes, 
A Tribe Divided: Snoqualmie Members Fight for Control of Government, Casino, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2008, at A1. 
24. See Quair v. Sisco (Quair I), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 962 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (involving permanent 
disenrollment and physical banishment); sources cited supra note 20 (cases and newspaper articles 
discussing tribal banishment). Sometimes tribal members are temporarily banished, similar to 
historic banishment, as a way to contemplate their crimes against the tribe. See Colin Miller, 
Banishment from Within and Without: Analyzing Indigenous Sentencing Under International 
Human Rights Standards, 80 N.D. L. REV. 253, 255–57 (2004). 
25. See, e.g., Poodry, 85 F.3d at 876; Sweet I, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1198; Quair I, 359 F. Supp. 2d 
at 962; Alire v. Jackson, 65 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (D. Or. 1999). 
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Individuals also use the same ICRA habeas provision to challenge 
their tribal disenrollment, often relying on similar arguments as in 
banishment cases.26 Also on the rise in recent decades,27 disenrollment 
usually involves loss of tribal citizenship and denial of access to tribal 
facilities.28 Despite the line federal courts have drawn between 
disenrollment and banishment, the functional difference between the two 
is often not significant. Tribes have sovereign authority to exclude 
nonmembers from tribal lands.29 As a result, once tribal members are 
stripped of their tribal citizenship—through banishment or 
disenrollment—the tribe can then expel that individual from tribal lands. 
Both banishment and disenrollment impose significant hardship on 
individuals through loss of tribal citizenship, benefits, and access to 
tribal facilities. But federal courts should refrain from exercising habeas 
jurisdiction over banishment actions, given tribal sovereignty and tribal 
authority to make membership decisions.30 Tribal sovereignty was hard 
won and tribes continue to struggle for the right to determine 
membership and governance free from federal interference.31 Without 
sovereign authority to determine its own membership, a tribe’s cultural 
identity is in peril. Denying habeas jurisdiction over banishment actions 
may leave some tribal members without a remedy, but such a result is 
necessary to preserve tribal sovereignty and promote tribal self-
government.32 Such a result also corresponds to the careful balance 
struck by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court between individual 
rights and tribal sovereignty.33 
                                                     
26. See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3327; Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). 
27. See Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, If You Build It, They Will Come: Preserving Tribal 
Sovereignty in the Face of Indian Casinos and the New Premium on Tribal Membership, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 311, 312–14, 320 (2010) (noting that tribes in California alone have disenrolled 
over 5000 members since 2002); Marc Cooper, Tribal Flush: Pechanga People “Disenrolled” en 
Masse, LA WEEKLY (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.laweekly.com/2008-01-03/news/tribal-flush-
pechanga-people-disenrolled-en-masse/ (discussing how tribes have disenrolled thousands of 
members in recent years due to gaming corruption and greed). 
28. See, e.g., Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918–19; Shenandoah, 159 F.3d at 711, 714. 
29. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
30. A tribe’s authority to determine its own membership is critical to its existence as an 
independent, self-governing body. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.  
31. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 1.06–.07, at 89–113 (Nell 
Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (describing federal policy toward Indian tribes 
from the termination era to the self-governance era). 
32. See Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976) (finding that a jurisdictional holding that 
sometimes denies relief to an individual tribal member may be necessary to preserve tribal 
sovereignty, which in turn will benefit more individual tribal members on the whole). 
33. See infra Part II.C. (discussing ICRA’s legislative history); infra Part III (discussing the U.S. 
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Part I of this Comment provides an overview of historic tribal 
sovereignty and Indian law canons of construction, which govern 
judicial interpretation of statutes regulating tribal affairs. Part II 
describes the historical context, statutory text, and legislative history of 
ICRA relevant to interpreting the Act’s habeas provision. Part III 
discusses Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,34 in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted ICRA for the first time and foreclosed any implied 
causes of action, leaving habeas as the only federal remedy for ICRA 
violations. Part IV details U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of general 
federal habeas jurisdiction to inform proper interpretation of ICRA’s 
habeas provision. Part V discusses federal court cases addressing 
whether ICRA’s habeas provision can be used to challenge tribal 
banishment or disenrollment. Lastly, Part VI argues that federal courts 
should not assert habeas jurisdiction over tribal banishment, because: (1) 
exercising habeas jurisdiction over tribal banishment actions contravenes 
federal Indian law canons of construction; (2) expansive habeas 
jurisdiction upsets the delicate balance struck by Congress and the U.S. 
Supreme Court between individual rights and tribal sovereignty; (3) 
declining jurisdiction protects tribes’ sovereign authority to determine 
their own membership; and (4) the line between banishment and 
disenrollment is arbitrary because tribes have authority to exclude 
nonmembers from tribal lands. Federal courts should refrain from 
exercising habeas jurisdiction under ICRA in challenges to tribal 
banishment actions. Tribal courts are available to vindicate individual 
tribal members’ rights guaranteed under ICRA in a manner that 
preserves and advances tribal sovereignty. 
I.  TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY INFORMS HOW THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND COURTS ACT TOWARD TRIBES 
Tribes were sovereign entities prior to their relationship with the 
United States.35 They retain a limited form of that sovereignty, with the 
power to self-govern and determine tribal membership.36 Although 
Congress retains plenary power over the tribes,37 Congress and federal 
                                                     
Supreme Court’s seminal Martinez case interpreting ICRA). 
34. 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978). 
35. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.  
36. See infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
37. “Plenary power” is a term of art in federal Indian law. It means that the federal government 
has broad power to regulate Indian affairs exclusive of state authority. United States v. Lara, 541 
U.S. 193, 200 (2004). This broad authority comes largely from the U.S. Constitution’s Indian 
Commerce Clause, Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989), which 
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courts nonetheless recognize that tribal sovereignty requires deference to 
tribal decision-making.38 In turn, this deference informs Indian law 
canons of construction, which guide how federal courts interpret statutes 
regulating Indian tribes.39 
A. Federal Court Deference to Tribal Sovereignty Reflects Tribes’ 
Historic Power as Independent, Self-Governing Communities 
One of the fundamental principles of Indian law is that tribes are 
sovereign entities.40 Tribes acted as independent, self-governing nations 
prior to their relationship with the United States and they retain some 
aspects of that sovereignty under contemporary law.41 Tribal sovereignty 
means the U.S. government treats tribes42 as “distinct, independent 
political communities.”43 Although Congress retains plenary power to 
regulate tribal affairs,44 tribes are nonetheless considered self-governing, 
separate peoples.45 Tribal justice systems are vital to this self-
                                                     
permits Congress “to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
But see Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 113, 115 (2002) (arguing that there is no legitimate historical or textual basis for federal plenary 
authority over tribes). 
38. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980) (discussing 
federal deference to tribal development and self-government). 
39. See infra Part I.B. 
40. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832) (“The Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as 
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial . . . .”). See generally COHEN, supra 
note 31, § 4.01, at 204–11 (discussing tribal sovereignty as the basis of federal Indian law). 
41. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978) (“Before the coming of the 
Europeans, the tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities. Like all sovereign 
bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish 
infractions of those laws.” (citation omitted)). 
42. In general, when the federal legal system or government refers to an Indian tribe, it means a 
federally recognized tribe that has political affiliation with the U.S. government. See COHEN, supra 
note 31, §3.02[2], at 137; see also Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 479a, 479a-1 (2006). 
43. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519.  
44. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56–57 (1978) (“Congress has plenary authority 
to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise 
possess.” (citing cases)). Despite this plenary power, tribes retain their inherent sovereignty and 
powers of self-government unless and until Congress regulates tribal affairs. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 
323. 
45. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55 (recognizing that tribes have powers of self-government); Talton 
v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382–84 (1896) (holding that tribes are not constrained by federal 
Constitution); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886) (noting that tribes are 
considered a separate people with powers of internal regulation). A concomitant tribal right is the 
authority to exercise jurisdiction over and impose criminal sanctions on tribal members, absent any 
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government.46 Federal law encourages tribes to develop tribal justice 
systems based on their own cultural traditions and customs.47 So long as 
they do not violate ICRA, tribal courts may enact and interpret laws 
based on their own unique justice traditions.48 
Also integral to tribal sovereignty is a tribe’s power to determine its 
own membership.49 Although Congress can regulate tribal 
membership,50 the U.S. Supreme Court accords deference to tribal 
membership determinations: “A tribe’s right to define its own 
membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its 
existence as an independent political community.”51 Consequently, 
courts should not infer abrogation of tribal power to determine 
membership absent explicit congressional intent.52 Inherent in tribal 
power to determine membership is the power to exclude nonmembers 
from tribal territory.53 Tribes maintain sovereign authority over their 
territory and members through this exclusionary power.54 
                                                     
abrogating federal law. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) (recognizing that tribes 
have the right to maintain “order and peace among their own members by administration of their 
own laws and customs”). 
46. See Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5) (2006) (“[T]ribal justice systems 
are an essential part of tribal governments . . . .”); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14–15 
(1987) (recognizing the long-standing importance of tribal court systems). 
47. See 25 U.S.C. § 3601(7) (“[T]raditional tribal justice practices are essential to the 
maintenance of the culture and identity of Indian tribes . . . .”); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 
602, 603–04 (1916) (explaining that a dispute between two tribal members should be resolved 
“according to their tribal customs and laws”); cf. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 (limiting federal court 
“interfere[nce] with a tribe’s ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity” 
(footnote omitted)).  
48. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601(4)–(7); accord Angela R. Riley, (Tribunal) Sovereignty and 
Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 839 (2007) (“Indian tribes are authorized and encouraged to 
apply ICRA’s provisions consistent with tribal values and traditions.” (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 
57)). 
49. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32. 
50. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States and the Choctaws and Chicksaws, §§ 27–35, 
July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 641 (specifying rules for enrollment of Choctaw and Chicksaw citizens and 
freedmen); Treaty with the Seminole Indians, U.S.–Seminole Nation of Indians, art. 2, Mar. 21, 
1866, 14 Stat. 756 (regulating tribal membership based on descent). 
51. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32 (citing Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) and 
Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897)). 
52. See id.  
53. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982) (recognizing tribes’ 
“inherent power to exclude nonmembers”); 55 Interior Dec. 14, 48 (1934) (recognizing the “power 
of an Indian tribe to exclude nonmembers of the tribe from entering upon the reservation . . . .”); see 
also Water Wheel, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810–11 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing well-
established tribal authority to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands). 
54. See COHEN, supra note 31, § 4.01[a][e], at 220.  
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B. Courts Employ Indian Law Canons of Construction to Interpret 
Federal Statutes Regulating Tribes 
Tribal sovereignty informs how courts interpret federal Indian law. 
Indian law canons of construction provide unique modes of 
interpretation for courts to apply in Indian law cases,55 in light of the 
“unique trust relationship” between tribes and the federal government.56 
Courts originally developed these canons to interpret tribal treaties,57 but 
have since applied them to federal statutes.58 Three Indian law canons 
are pertinent to this discussion. First, courts should construe statutes 
liberally in favor of the tribe.59 Second, courts should resolve any 
statutory ambiguities in favor of the tribe.60 And third, courts should 
uphold tribal sovereignty unless congressional intent to abrogate it is 
clear and unambiguous.61 Thus, these canons direct courts to construe 
statutes in favor of tribes, which in turn protects tribal sovereignty and 
self-governance.62 
II. ICRA REFLECTS CONGRESS’S ATTEMPT TO BALANCE 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITH TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
Congress enacted ICRA at a time when the federal government was 
                                                     
55. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (“[T]he standard principles of 
statutory construction do not have their usual force in cases involving Indian law.”). 
56. Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985). This trust relationship 
creates a presumption that the federal government acts in good faith toward the tribes, see id., 
because tribes have a “government-to-government relationship” with the federal government, much 
like the states. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (referring to a tribe as a 
“domestic dependent nation”). 
57. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551–52 (1832) (using Indian law canons to 
interpret a tribal treaty). 
58. See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766 (using Indian law canons to interpret a federal 
statute regulating tribal affairs). 
59. Id. (“[S]tatues are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions 
interpreted to their benefit.”). 
60. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (“[D]oubtful expressions, instead of being 
resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor [of the tribes].”).  
61. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986) (“What is essential is clear evidence 
that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and 
Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty.”); Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1978). 
62. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980) 
(“Ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with these 
traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy encouraging tribal independence.” 
(citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174–75 & n.13 (1973)). 
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strengthening policies of tribal self-determination and self-governance. 
The historic Civil Rights Movement concurrently championed individual 
rights. The controversial Act attempted to strike a balance between these 
two divergent movements.63 To that end, Congress deliberately provided 
a narrow federal remedy for ICRA violations so as not to impose an 
undue burden on the tribes or unnecessarily abrogate their sovereignty.64 
A. Congress Enacted ICRA During the Civil Rights Era, When 
Federal Policy Embraced Tribal Sovereignty 
From World War II to the early 1960s, the U.S. government practiced 
a policy of tribal termination.65 Forced assimilation, relocation, loss of 
tribal lands and traditional tribal governments, along with transfer of 
jurisdiction over Indian Country from federal to state courts,66 severely 
weakened tribal sovereignty during this period.67 The 1960s signaled a 
shift away from termination.68 Presidential initiatives promoted tribal 
self-determination and self-governance.69 Tribes became more vocal 
during this period, demanding the right to develop their own policies and 
governments.70 Amid this increasing emphasis on tribal self-
                                                     
63. See infra Part II.B–C. 
64. See infra Part II.B–C. 
65. See, e.g., S. 2726, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) (proposing to eliminate the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs); see also 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1948) (authorizing New York to assume criminal jurisdiction 
over all Indians in the state). The goal of termination was to end federal support to the tribes and 
assimilate them into mainstream American culture. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1952) (calling for legislature to “promote the earliest practicable termination of all federal 
supervision and control over Indians”). Congressional bills during the time also proposed to 
terminate specific tribes, with a devastating impact. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 891 (1954) (terminating 
Menominee Tribe), repealed by Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. 93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770 
(1973). 
66. See Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (repealed and reenacted as amended in ICRA, 25 
U.S.C. § 1321) (transferring criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribes from federal to state 
governments). 
67. COHEN, supra note 31, § 1.06, at 95–96. 
68. See generally THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON 
ADMINISTRATIONS, 1961–1969 (2001).  
69. See, e.g., Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, July 8, 1970, in PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON, 1970, at 564–76 (1971) (calling for 
increased tribal self-determination); Special Message to Congress on the Problems of the American 
Indian: “The Forgotten American,” Mar. 6, 1968, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: LYNDON JOHNSON, 1968–69 BOOK I, at 335–44 (1970) (declaring the new goal of 
tribal self-determination).  
70. See STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 119–20, 123–26 (1988) (describing 
numerous multitribal gatherings designed to promote tribal rights); see also COHEN, supra note 31, 
§ 1.07, at 100 (citing Declaration of Indian Purpose, American Indian Chicago Conference 1961). 
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determination, Congress enacted the period’s most controversial tribal 
legislation: the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.71 
B. ICRA Requires Tribes to Recognize Substantive Individual Rights 
and Provides a Limited Federal Remedy for Violations of Those 
Rights 
Title II of ICRA delineates substantive individual rights similar to 
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.72 
These substantive rights include the free exercise of religion, freedom of 
speech and press, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
freedom from double jeopardy, protection from self-incrimination, 
assistance of counsel, prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, 
equal protection, and due process, among others.73 Section 1302 of the 
Act requires that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising the powers of self-
government shall” abridge these substantive provisions.74 
Section 1302(a)(7), which forbids cruel and unusual punishment, also 
originally prohibited tribes from imposing more than six months’ 
imprisonment and a $500 fine as punishment for violating tribal laws.75 
As part of a national effort to fight drug abuse,76 Congress amended this 
                                                     
71. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). One author described ICRA as a “complex compromise 
intended to guarantee that tribal governments respect civil rights while minimizing federal 
interference with tribal culture and tradition.” Robert McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The 
Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 467 (1998) (footnote omitted). The Act 
was controversial because many believed it did not go far enough to protect tribal members’ rights, 
while others argued it went too far in imposing the U.S. legal system on traditional tribal 
governments. See COHEN, supra note 31, § 14.04[2], at 956–57. 
72. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303. Section 1301 of ICRA provides 
key definitions for interpreting the statute. 25 U.S.C. § 1301. For instance, it defines “Indian tribe” 
as “any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and 
recognized as possessing powers of self-government.” Id. The statute defines “powers of self-
government” to be “all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, 
and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including 
courts of Indian offenses.” Id. In that same definition, the statute recognizes “the inherent power of 
Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.” Id. 
73. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Although the language of § 1302 resembles the 
Bill of Rights, some provisions in the Bill of Rights are notably absent from ICRA, including the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the entire Second, Third, and Seventh 
Amendments. Id.; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n.14 (1978). 
74. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
75. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1970).  
76. See Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-137 (finding alcoholism and drug abuse to be the “most severe health and 
social problem facing Indian tribes”). The Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act was part of the larger Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which altered many other 
federal statutes. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as 
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provision in 1986 to allow tribal courts to impose a maximum sentence 
of one year imprisonment and a $5000 fine.77 Congress again amended 
this limitation in 2010 to allow for three years maximum imprisonment 
for any one offense for repeat offenders, a $15,000 fine, and up to nine 
years of stackable sentences.78 With this recent amendment, Congress 
aimed to assist tribes in reducing crime, drug abuse, and domestic 
violence in tribal communities.79 
Despite these numerous substantive provisions, Congress delineated 
only one federal procedure through which individuals can challenge 
tribal violations of ICRA: the writ of habeas corpus.80 Section 1303 of 
the Act provides that “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the 
legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.”81 The statute does 
not define “detention” or otherwise articulate the scope of appropriate 
habeas jurisdiction.82 For ten years after ICRA’s enactment, many 
federal courts inferred broad federal civil jurisdiction over alleged ICRA 
violations.83 In 1978, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez foreclosed these implied causes of action and limited 
federal court jurisdiction to the Act’s habeas provision.84 
                                                     
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
77. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-137, 146 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988)). 
78. Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2279 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D), (b) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
79. See id. 
80. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006). 
81. Id. 
82. See id.  
83. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding 
implied federal jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) for ICRA due process and equal 
protection violations); Crow v. E. Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1234 (4th Cir. 
1974) (same); Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Cmty., 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1973) (same). 
84. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69–70 (1978); see also infra Part III (discussing 
Martinez). The Martinez decision fundamentally altered the scope of federal review of ICRA 
violations by foreclosing all implied causes of action. Id.; see also cases cited supra note 83. After 
Martinez, federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction over ICRA actions if they fall within the 
narrow scope of habeas review. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 69–70. But see Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. 
Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980). Ignoring the Martinez decision, the 
Tenth Circuit in Dry Creek Lodge permitted tribal members to proceed with a civil action brought 
under ICRA against their tribe. Id. at 685. Dry Creek Lodge, described as “clearly wrong,” has been 
met with much criticism by courts and scholars. COHEN, supra note 31, § 14.04[2], at 957. 
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C. ICRA’s Legislative History Demonstrates Congress’s Concern with 
Balancing Tribal Sovereignty and Individual Rights 
In 1961, Congress, motivated by the Civil Rights Movement, initiated 
hearings to investigate purported violations of tribal members’ civil 
rights by tribal, state, and federal governments.85 Disconcerted that tribes 
were not bound by the U.S. Constitution,86 the primary sponsor of the 
bill, Senator Sam Ervin, intended ICRA to “grant the American Indians 
rights which are secured to other Americans.”87 Opponents of ICRA 
believed it would abrogate tribal sovereignty by imposing substantive 
constitutional provisions on the tribes.88 Proponents, on the other hand, 
argued the Act would in fact protect tribal sovereignty.89 
The original proposed legislation included eight bills guaranteeing 
individual rights, providing methods for vindicating those rights, and 
enhancing federal jurisdiction over major crimes committed in Indian 
Country.90 The first bill in the proposed legislation, Senate Bill 961, 
imposed on Indian tribes all the “same limitations and restraints” as the 
                                                     
85. See generally Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearing on S. Res. 53 Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961). For a 
thorough discussion of these alleged civil rights violations, as well as constitutional guarantees 
available in tribal courts prior to ICRA, see generally Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis 
of the 1968 ‘Indian Civil Rights’ Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557 (1972).  
86. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (explaining that tribes existed prior to the U.S. 
Constitution and are therefore not bound by the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of indictment by a 
grand jury). Lower federal courts subsequently expanded the holding of Talton to exempt tribes 
from the purview of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, among others. See, e.g., Native Am. 
Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134–35 (10th Cir. 1959) (tribes not constrained by 
First Amendment); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th 
Cir. 1958) (tribes not constrained by Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). Talton is still good law, 
and tribes remain free from constrictions of the U.S. Constitution. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56 
(discussing the ramifications of Talton and its progeny). 
87. Rights of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearings on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the 
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
131 (1969) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Sen. Sam Ervin, Jr.). 
88. Id. at 37 (testimony of Domingo Montoya, Chairman, All Indian Pueblo Council of New 
Mexico); id. at 39 (Resolution of All Indian Pueblo Council), id. at 42 (testimony of Tom Olson, 
Attorney, All Indian Pueblo Council). 
89. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63–64 (1978) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 9596 
(1968) (remarks of Rep. Lloyd Meeds); House Hearings, supra note 87, at 108). For instance, Title 
III of ICRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326, prohibits states from exercising jurisdiction over a tribe 
without the tribe’s express consent. Id.  
90. See Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings on S. 961, S. 962, S. 963, S. 964, 
S. 965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968 and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5–13 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Hearings] (S. 961–
68). 
WLR December Swift FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/9/2011  10:52 AM 
954 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:941 
 
U.S. Constitution.91 Many individuals objected to this provision because 
it imposed Western legal and cultural norms wholesale onto tribes, 
which critics believed would unduly interfere with tribal sovereignty.92 
Consequently, Congress instead opted to impose only some 
constitutional provisions on the tribes out of deference to tribal culture 
and self-government.93 
Additionally, the original proposed legislation afforded a number of 
different avenues for federal court review of tribal actions.94 For 
instance, the original bill provided for federal de novo review of all 
tribal court convictions.95 While those testifying before the committee 
agreed that some form of federal appellate review was necessary to 
protect individual tribal members’ rights,96 tribal representatives argued 
that de novo review would displace tribal courts and burden already 
overworked federal courts.97 In light of these critiques, Congress 
eliminated the de novo review provision from the final version of the 
Act.98 The original proposed legislation also included a provision that 
allowed the Attorney General to investigate civil complaints filed by 
tribal members alleging ICRA violations.99 Similarly criticized as 
                                                     
91. Id. at 5 (S. 961). 
92. See, e.g., id. at 17–18 (statement of Frank J. Barry, Solicitor, Department of the Interior); see 
also Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Summary Rep. of Hearings and Investigations by 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9–10 
(1966) [hereinafter 1966 Summary Report] (summarizing some of the criticisms of wholesale 
imposition of the U.S. Constitution on tribes). 
93. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78, 77–78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010)); 1965 Hearings, supra note 90, at 318–19 (noting that the Department of Interior originally 
suggested incorporating only some constitutional provisions); see also supra note 73 (discussing 
Bill of Rights provisions absent from ICRA). 
94. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings, supra note 90, at 6–7 (S. 962, 963); see also Burnett, supra note 85, 
at 592–95 (discussing hearings on S. 962 and S. 963). 
95. 1965 Hearings, supra note 90, at 6–7 (S. 962). 
96. 1966 Summary Report, supra note 92, at 12 (explaining that no one appearing before the 
Senate subcommittee opposed some type of appellate review of tribal actions). 
97. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings, supra note 90, at 22 (statement of Solicitor Barry) (expressing 
concern that de novo review would overburden federal dockets and harm independence of tribal 
governments); id. at 79 (Res. No. SR–442–65 of Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community 
Tribal Council, Scottsdale, Ariz.) (explaining that de novo federal review would “deprive the tribal 
court of all jurisdiction in the event of an appeal, thus having a harmful effect upon law enforcement 
within the reservation”); id. at 157 (statement of William Day, Jr., Trial J., Rosebud Tribal Court, 
Winner, S.D.) (expressing concern over potential financial burden of de novo appeal for individual 
Indian defendants). 
98. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–1303 (2006)). 
99. 1965 Hearings, supra note 90, at 7–8 (S. 963). 
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intrusive and impractical,100 the Attorney General provision was also 
eliminated from the final version of the Act.101 Instead, the Act contains 
only the limited federal habeas provision for challenging tribal 
detention.102 
Congress has since reconsidered whether to provide additional federal 
court remedies for tribal members alleging ICRA violations.103 In 1991, 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report examining the 
effects and successes of ICRA.104 The Report stated that the biggest 
problem with vindicating tribal members’ rights under ICRA was not 
lack of federal jurisdiction over claims, but rather lack of funding, 
resources, and training in tribal courts.105 Given these findings, the 
Report recommended increased support for tribal courts instead of 
increased jurisdiction for federal courts.106 This, the Report concluded, 
would in turn improve respect for tribal sovereignty.107 In response to 
this Report, Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993 to 
strengthen tribal court systems through additional funding and 
support.108 Again affirming tribal sovereignty, Congress declined to 
enact a separate bill—the American Indian Equal Justice Act of 1998—
that would have waived tribal sovereign immunity in federal courts for 
civil ICRA violations.109 Thus, ICRA’s limitation on federal court 
                                                     
100. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings, supra note 90, at 235 (statement of Edison Real Bird, Rep., Crow 
Tribal Delegation) (voicing concern that the proposed bill “would in effect subject the tribal 
sovereignty of self-government to the Federal Government”); id. at 343 (statement of Wendell 
Chino, President, Mescalero Apache Tribal Council) (arguing that the proposed legislation “would 
be used to undermine and harass existing tribal governments” by dissatisfied individual Indians).  
101. See 82 Stat. at 77–78; see also 1966 Summary Report, supra note 92, at 11 (explaining that 
the final bill aimed to “prevent[] injustices perpetuated by tribal governments, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, avoid[] undue or precipitous interference with the affairs of the Indian people”). 
102. 82 Stat. at 78. Compare 1965 Hearings, supra note 90, at 6 (S. 962) (de novo review 
provision), and id. (S. 963) (Attorney General review provision), with 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (enacted 
habeas provision providing the only federal remedy for tribal violations of the Act). 
103. See generally American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); 
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (June 1991) [hereinafter 1991 
ICRA REPORT].  
104. See 1991 ICRA REPORT, supra note 103, at 1–2.  
105. Id. at 71–74. 
106. Id. at 74. 
107. Id. 
108. See Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3621). The Indian Tribal Justice Act also affirmed congressional dedication to 
tribal sovereignty, including tribal “self-determination, self-reliance,” and “inherent authority to 
establish their own form of government, including tribal justice systems.” 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601(2)–(4) 
(2006). 
109. American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. §§ 1, 4 (1998) (calling for “Indian 
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jurisdiction remains in full force today. 
III.  THE MARTINEZ COURT LIMITED FEDERAL COURT 
REVIEW OF ICRA VIOLATIONS AND DEFERRED TO 
TRIBAL ENROLLMENT DECISIONS 
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the scope of ICRA in the 
landmark case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.110 Attempting to balance 
individual rights and tribal sovereignty, the Court found no implied 
federal civil remedy for ICRA violations.111 This holding limited federal 
court review to challenges brought under ICRA’s habeas provision, 
making tribal courts the primary arbiters of ICRA’s substantive 
provisions.112 Given this limited remedy, relatively few ICRA cases have 
been brought in federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court has analyzed 
ICRA’s habeas provision in only one other instance.113 
A. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez Limited the Scope of Federal Court 
Jurisdiction over Tribal Government Actions Challenged Under 
ICRA 
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, a group of female members of the 
Santa Clara Pueblo tribe and their children instituted a class action 
alleging that a tribal ordinance violated ICRA’s equal protection 
provision.114 The ordinance specified that Santa Clara Pueblo men who 
married outside the tribe could pass on their tribal membership to their 
                                                     
tribal governments [to be] subject to judicial review with respect to certain civil matters” and giving 
federal courts “original jurisdiction in any civil action or claim against an Indian tribe”). 
110. 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978). 
111. Id. at 52. 
112. Id. at 65. 
113. In Duro v. Reina, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a tribe had criminal 
jurisdiction over an Indian defendant who belonged to another tribe. 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). The 
Court’s holding, that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, id., was 
subsequently overturned by an ICRA amendment extending tribal criminal jurisdiction to “all 
Indians” (called the “Duro Fix”). See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-511, 
104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93; see also ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES 
AND COMMENTARY 598–602 (2d ed., 2008). In 2004, the Court upheld this ICRA amendment in 
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004). A search of the leading Indian law treatises and 
subsequent case law revealed no other instances where the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed Title 
II of ICRA or reconsidered the scope of ICRA’s habeas provision. 
114. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51, 53; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (Supp. IV 2010) (forbidding 
Indian tribes from “deny[ing] . . . any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its 
laws”). 
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children, while tribal women could not.115 Julia Martinez, the named 
class representative and a full-blooded Santa Clara Puebla, was 
permitted to live on the reservation with her family after she married a 
Navajo Indian.116 Under the ordinance, however, her children would 
have no right to remain on the reservation or inherit family lands after 
her death.117 
Both the district court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found an 
implied civil cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) for ICRA 
violations,118 but disagreed on the merits of the equal protection claim.119 
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because Congress delineated substantive 
rights in ICRA, it must have intended to permit civil suits against the 
tribe to vindicate those rights.120 Reaching the merits, the Tenth Circuit 
found that the tribe’s ordinance violated ICRA’s equal protection 
provision.121 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and 
held that ICRA could not be read to imply a federal civil cause of action 
and therefore did not even reach the merits of the equal protection 
claim.122 Simply put, the Court found ICRA’s specific enumeration of a 
habeas remedy to exclude all other implied remedies.123 
B. Relying on ICRA’s Legislative History and Structure, the Martinez 
Court Emphasized Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Determination 
The Court reached its decision in Martinez by conducting a thorough 
review of ICRA’s historical context, statutory structure, and legislative 
                                                     
115. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51. 
116. Id. at 52. 
117. Id. at 52–53. Fortunately, Julia Martinez’s children were not actually forced to relinquish 
their tribal lands and leave the reservation after their mother’s death. In fact, many of her 
descendents still live on the reservation. Bethany R. Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian 
Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112 (2004) (citing Obituary of Myles Martinez, SANTA FE 
NEW MEXICAN, Oct. 30, 2001, at B2). 
118. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 53–55. Section 1343(4) of the U.S. Code gives federal courts 
“jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . to secure 
equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights.” Id. 
at 53 n.4 (alteration in original) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1343(4)). Before Martinez, many federal courts 
permitted civil suits against tribes under ICRA by inferring a federal civil cause of action based on 
25 U.S.C. § 1343(4). See cases cited supra note 83. Basically, lower federal courts were implying a 
federal cause of action separate from and broader than ICRA’s habeas provision—the only 
enumerated federal cause of action in ICRA.  
119. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 53–55.  
120. Id. at 55. 
121. Id.  
122. Id. at 52, 55.  
123. See id. at 69–70. 
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history.124 Principles of tribal sovereignty formed the backdrop for the 
Court’s analysis.125 Reading it in this context, the Court interpreted 
ICRA to be a limited exercise of plenary congressional power, because it 
requires tribes to recognize individual rights.126 However, the Court 
acknowledged that tribes retain the right to regulate internal relations, 
develop substantive laws, and enforce those laws in their own tribal 
forums.127 
In reviewing ICRA’s legislative history, the Court found it instructive 
that Congress considered and rejected a number of more comprehensive 
forms of federal review before settling on the habeas provision.128 The 
Martinez Court held that that Congress’s decision to provide only the 
habeas remedy was a deliberate attempt to balance tribal sovereignty 
with individual rights.129 Given this legislative history, the Court 
determined that Congress intended § 1303 to be the only mechanism for 
relief in federal court.130 
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized the importance of 
tribal self-determination, especially in tribal enrollment decisions: “A 
tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long 
been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political 
community.”131 Ultimately, the Court concluded that tribal courts, not 
federal courts, must protect and uphold ICRA’s substantive 
provisions.132 Foreclosing a civil cause of action, the Court explained, 
also prevents federal courts from undermining tribal authority and 
                                                     
124. Id. at 56–72. 
125. Id. at 60. The Court also briefly addressed the issue of tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 58–
59. The Court concluded that the Act did not abrogate a tribe’s sovereign immunity except in the 
limited circumstance of habeas, which is not considered a suit against the sovereign. Id. 
126. See id. at 57. 
127. Id. at 55–56. 
128. Id. at 67; see also supra text accompanying notes 92–101 (discussing originally proposed 
provisions of ICRA, including provisions for federal de novo review of all tribal convictions and 
Attorney General investigation of civil complaints of ICRA violations).  
129. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 67. 
130. Id. at 69–70.  
131. Id. at 72 n.32 (citing Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) and Roff v. Burney, 
168 U.S. 218 (1897)); see also supra text accompanying notes 49–54 (discussing tribal power to 
determine membership). 
132. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65–66 (“Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate 
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests 
of both Indians and non-Indians.” (citations omitted)). Given the availability of tribal forums and 
traditional deference to tribal sovereignty, the Court concluded that it was “reluctant to disturb the 
balance between the dual statutory objectives which Congress apparently struck in providing only 
for habeas corpus relief.” Id. at 66. 
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protects tribes from the heavy financial burdens of regularly defending 
tribal actions in federal court.133 To implement the congressional vision 
of ICRA as balancing individual rights and tribal sovereignty, the U.S. 
Supreme Court made clear that habeas was the only federal remedy 
available for ICRA violations.134 
The significance of Martinez cannot be overstated.135 Indeed, one year 
later in Cannon v. University of Chicago,136 the Court explained that at 
that time, Martinez was the sole exception to the general rule that the 
Court will imply a cause of action when Congress explicitly creates an 
affirmative right for a group of people.137 The Cannon Court went on to 
explain that Martinez involved a “virtually unique situation” where an 
individual asked for an implied cause of action, but was rebuffed 
because tribes are “protected by a strong presumption of autonomy and 
self-government, as well as by a special duty on the part of the Federal 
Government to deal fairly and openly, and by a legislative history 
indicative of an intent to limit severely judicial interference in tribal 
affairs.”138 Thus, the Martinez Court followed Congress’s perceived 
intent and protected tribal sovereignty from unwarranted federal 
intrusion. 
IV.  FEDERAL COURTS MAY EXERCISE HABEAS 
JURISDICTION ONLY WHEN THERE ARE SEVERE 
RESTRAINTS ON INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not further defined the scope of ICRA’s 
habeas provision since Martinez.139 Traditionally, individuals use the 
writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their custody.140 The 
Court interprets “custody” to include not only physical custody, but also 
“severe restraints on individual liberty,”141 like parole.142 Though 
ICRA’s habeas provision uses the term “detention” rather than 
                                                     
133. Id. at 64–65; see also supra note 97 (citing testimony at Senate Committee hearings). 
134. Id at 69–70. 
135. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979).  
136. 441 U.S. 677. 
137. Id. at 690 n.13. 
138. Id. (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55, 58–59, 63–64, 67–70 & n.30). 
139. The Duro Court addressed whether tribes had criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, 
but did not discuss the scope of habeas jurisdiction under ICRA. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 
(1990); see also supra note 113 (discussing Duro). 
140. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). 
141. Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). 
142. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
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“custody,” lower federal courts interpret “detention” coterminously with 
“custody” in other federal habeas statutes.143 
A. Habeas Is a Limited Remedy, Available When There Are Severe 
and Immediate Restraints on Individual Liberty 
Habeas is a historic remedy, adopted by the American legal system 
from English common law.144 Today, it is often used to obtain federal 
court review of state court criminal convictions.145 The basic statutory 
provision that governs federal habeas jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 
which allows a person to petition for habeas when “in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”146 
The statute does not define “custody,”147 but the U.S. Supreme Court 
analyzes common law and historical uses of habeas in the United States 
and England to determine when the writ can be used to challenge a 
restraint on liberty.148 
Habeas is an “extraordinary remedy” available only in instances of 
“special urgency” to challenge “severe restraints on individual 
liberty.”149 Individuals must use “more conventional remedies” where 
liberty restraints are “neither severe nor immediate.”150 Despite this 
limited scope, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the writ is not 
                                                     
143. See infra Part IV.B. 
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The U.S. Constitution explicitly protects the right of habeas 
corpus in the Suspension Clause: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Id.; see 
also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1153–54 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining that habeas was traditionally used to 
challenge non-judicial executive detentions). 
145. FALLON, supra note 144, at 1154. 
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). Section 2254 of the U.S. Code governs federal review of 
state court convictions, while 28 U.S.C. § 2255 governs habeas petitions from prisoners in federal 
custody. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2255 (2006).  
147. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 238 (“[T]he statute does not attempt to mark the boundaries of 
‘custody’ nor in any way other than by use of that word attempt to limit the situations in which the 
writ can be used.”). 
148. Id. 
149. Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). 
150. Id. An example of a “more conventional remedy” is a civil rights action brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that § 1983, not habeas, was the 
proper method for prisoners to seek access to DNA evidence for additional testing. See Skinner v. 
Switzer, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011). The Court explained that a proper habeas action 
must “necessarily imply” the invalidity of a conviction. Id. at 1298 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). Access to DNA evidence does not necessarily imply invalidity of a 
conviction, because it may be inconclusive or incriminating. Id. at 1298–99. 
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a “static, narrow, formalistic remedy.”151 Rather, “custody” encompasses 
more than just physical incarceration.152 Indeed, as early as 1722, 
English courts allowed individuals to use habeas to challenge restraints 
beyond just physical imprisonment.153 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most generous construction of habeas 
jurisdiction comes from Jones v. Cunningham154 and Hensley v. 
Municipal Court.155 In Jones, the Court held that parole imposed 
sufficient restraints on liberty to warrant habeas jurisdiction, despite the 
fact that the petitioner was released from physical custody.156 In that 
case, Virginia released a prisoner into the “custody and control” of the 
state parole board.157 Conditions of his parole required him to live with 
his aunt and uncle, make monthly reports to his parole officer, and get 
permission to leave the community, change his job or home, or drive a 
car.158 One misstep and his parole would be revoked, resulting in 
incarceration.159 Given all these parole conditions and the constant threat 
of imminent jail time, the Court found that the parolee was subject to 
substantially more restraints on his liberty than the public at large.160 
Therefore, the Jones Court found parole to be a severe enough restraint 
on liberty for the petitioner to be considered in “custody” for the 
                                                     
151. Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. 
152. See, e.g., Hensley, 411 U.S. at 346–47 (petitioner in “custody” where he was released on his 
own recognizance pending appeal, but was required to appear for court); Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 
341, 342 (1972) (petitioner in “custody” where he was called by the military for active duty); Jones, 
371 U.S. at 243 (ex-convict petitioner in “custody” where he was released on parole with significant 
restraints on his movement). 
153. Jones, 371 U.S. at 238–39 (citing Rex v. Clarkson, 1 Str. 444, 93 Eng. Rep. 625 (K.B. 
1722)) (woman required to stay away from her husband against her will properly used habeas 
corpus to challenge the action). For a detailed discussion of the Court’s interpretation of the custody 
requirement, see Ira P. Robbins & Susan M. Newell, The Continuing Diminishing Availability of 
Federal Habeas Review to Challenge State Court Judgments: Lehman v. Lycoming County 
Children’s Services Agency, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 275–81 (1984). 
154. 371 U.S. 236. 
155. 411 U.S. 345; see also Justices of Bos. Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 301 (1984) 
(finding habeas jurisdiction where petitioner’s conviction was vacated but he was awaiting a trial de 
novo, could be criminally liable for failing to appear, and was not permitted to leave the state of 
Massachusetts). 
156. Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. 
157. Id. at 237. 
158. Id. at 237, 242. 
159. Id. at 242 (“Petitioner must not only faithfully obey these restrictions and conditions but he 
must live in constant fear that a single deviation, however slight, might be enough to result in his 
being returned to prison . . . .”). 
160. See id. at 242–43. 
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purposes of habeas jurisdiction.161 
Relying on Jones,162 the Court in Hensley expanded “custody” to 
include release on one’s personal recognizance pending appeal of a 
criminal conviction.163 The Hensley Court conceded that a parolee’s 
liberty and movements are more restricted than an individual released on 
his own recognizance or on bail.164 However, the individual in Hensley 
would be immediately arrested if he failed to appear in court as required 
by the terms of his release.165 The state court could revoke his bail at any 
time,166 and unless he prevailed on appeal, the petitioner in Hensley 
would be sent to jail.167 These obligations and restrictions meant the 
petitioner’s “freedom of movement rest[ed] in the hands of state judicial 
officers.”168 Because he was subject to much more significant restraints 
than the law imposes on the general public, the petitioner was in 
“custody” for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction.169 Under Jones and 
Hensley, restraint is relative: courts must compare restrictions on the 
petitioner’s liberty with restrictions imposed on the public generally to 
determine whether the petitioner is in “custody” for habeas purposes.170 
B. Lower Federal Courts Interpret “Detention” in ICRA’s § 1303 
Coterminously with “Custody” in Other Federal Habeas Statutes 
ICRA’s habeas provision, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, makes federal habeas 
jurisdiction available to an individual “to test the legality of his detention 
                                                     
161. Id. at 243. 
162. Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (citing Jones, 371 U.S. at 240). 
163. Id. at 351–52. 
164. Id. at 348. 
165. Id. at 351. 
166. Id. at 348 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318.4(c)). 
167. Id. at 351–52. 
168. Id. at 351. 
169. Id. Concurring and dissenting Justices found the majority’s interpretation of “custody” to be 
far too tenuous. See, e.g., id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result) (“[T]he Court has 
wandered a long way down the road in expanding traditional notions of habeas corpus . . . the Court 
seems now to equate custody with almost any restraint, however tenuous. One wonders where the 
end is.”); id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If there is any vestige left of the obvious and the original 
meaning of ‘custody’ the court below was right and the majority opinion of this Court today has 
further stretched both the letter and the rationale of the statute . . . . Petitioner was under no greater 
restriction than one who had been subpoenaed to testify in court as a witness.”).  
170. See id. at 351 (majority opinion); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) 
(comparing parolee’s restraints to those of the general public); see also Robbins & Newell, supra 
note 153, at 279–80 (explaining that the Court looks to whether there are “restraints on liberty in 
excess of those imposed by the state on others”). 
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by order of an Indian tribe” in federal court.171 Neither Congress nor the 
U.S. Supreme Court has defined “detention,” but all federal circuit 
courts considering the issue interpret “detention” coterminously with 
“custody” in other federal habeas provisions.172 In Poodry v. Tonawanda 
Band of Seneca Indians, the petitioners argued that “detention” should 
be interpreted more broadly because of the different terminology and 
ICRA’s purpose of protecting individual tribal members.173 
Unpersuaded, the Second Circuit concluded that ICRA’s habeas 
provision should be interpreted coterminously with other federal habeas 
provisions.174 The court found that because other federal habeas statutes 
appear to use the terms “custody” and “detention” interchangeably,175 
there was no convincing evidence that Congress intended “detention” to 
have a different or broader meaning for ICRA habeas cases.176 
Following Poodry’s reasoning, the Ninth Circuit in Moore v. Nelson177 
likewise interpreted “detention” in ICRA coterminously with “custody” 
in other federal habeas statutes.178 The Ninth Circuit found that ICRA’s 
habeas provision may only be used to challenge severe restraints on 
liberty, such as parole or bail, as opposed to a monetary fine only.179 
                                                     
171. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006) (emphasis added). 
172. See, e.g., Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda 
Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 889–93 (2d Cir. 1996)); Dry v. CFR Ct. of Indian Offenses 
for the Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d 1207, 1208 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Poodry, 85 F.3d at 889–
93. These courts compared ICRA’s habeas provision with 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) (federal habeas 
jurisdiction over state court convictions), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (federal habeas review of state 
court convictions), and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (federal habeas review of federal court 
convictions). 
173. 85 F.3d at 890. 
174. Id. at 890–91. 
175. Id. at 891 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2243, 2244(a), 2245, 2249, 2253, 2255 (2006)).  
176. See id.  
177. 270 F.3d 789. 
178. Id. at 792. In Moore, the court was asked to determine whether a fine of over $18,000 alone 
satisfied “detention” within the meaning of § 1303. Id. at 790. Concluding that the scope of 
“detention” was coterminous with “custody,” the Ninth Circuit relied on Hensley and determined 
that a fine alone was not a severe enough restraint on liberty to come within U.S. Supreme Court 
habeas jurisprudence. Id. at 791 (“Bail status clearly restricts liberty in a way that a purely monetary 
fine does not.” (citing Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)). A prior set of Ninth Circuit 
cases found a tribal court fine to be sufficient for the “custody” requirement under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241. Id. (citing Settler v. Yakima Tribal Ct. (Settler I), 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969); Settler v. 
Lameer (Settler II), 419 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1969)). However, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
because this pair of cases was decided prior to Martinez and Hensley, they could not “survive” these 
subsequent controlling decisions. Id. at 791–92. 
179. See Moore, 270 F.3d at 792 (quoting Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351); accord Jeffredo v. Macarro, 
599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming Moore), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3327.  
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V. SINCE MARTINEZ, FEDERAL COURTS GENERALLY 
ASSERT HABEAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW TRIBAL 
BANISHMENT, BUT NOT DISENROLLMENT 
Among Martinez’s unanswered questions is whether ICRA’s habeas 
provision is broad enough to give federal courts jurisdiction to review 
tribal banishment and disenrollment actions. Only two circuit courts 
have considered this issue. In 1996, the Second Circuit found 
banishment to be a severe restraint on liberty warranting habeas 
jurisdiction.180 Two years later, however, the Second Circuit limited that 
holding by ruling that disenrollment does not constitute a sufficiently 
severe restraint on liberty to justify habeas jurisdiction.181 With a dearth 
of controlling cases, most federal courts follow the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning.182 The Ninth Circuit followed suit in 2010 when it declined to 
exercise habeas jurisdiction over a tribal disenrollment action.183 
A. The Second Circuit Exercises Habeas Jurisdiction over 
Banishment, but Not Disenrollment, Actions Where It Finds a 
Severe Actual or Potential Restraint on Liberty 
In its 1996 decision, Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 
the Second Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to permit 
tribal members to challenge the legality of their tribal banishment in 
federal court under ICRA’s habeas provision.184 Five members of the 
federally recognized Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians were 
summarily found guilty of treason and sentenced to permanent 
banishment for alleging that tribal council members misused funds, 
suspended elections, and committed other acts of fraud.185 The tribe 
ordered the individuals to “leave now and never return,” stripping them 
of their lands, tribal citizenship, Indian names, and all rights guaranteed 
to members of the tribe.186 The tribe attempted but failed to drive the 
banished individuals off the reservation.187 After this attempt, the 
                                                     
180. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 901 (2d Cir. 1996). 
181. Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). 
182. See, e.g., Sweet v. Hinzman (Sweet I), 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198–200 (W.D. Wash. 2008); 
Quair v. Sisco (Quair I), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 964–67 (E.D. Cal. 2004); cf. Alire v. Jackson, 65 F. 
Supp. 1124, 1129 (D. Or. 1999). 
183. Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 921. 
184. See Poodry, 85 F.3d at 879.  
185. Id. at 876–78. 
186. Id. at 876. 
187. Id. at 878. 
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petitioners were allegedly harassed, assaulted, and deprived of electricity 
at their homes and businesses.188 
The five banished tribal members sought habeas relief in federal 
district court, alleging violations of substantive provisions of ICRA.189 
The district court dismissed their suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, finding banishment to be insufficient for § 1303 habeas 
jurisdiction.190 The Second Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that 
banishment is a sufficient restraint on liberty to constitute “detention” 
within the meaning of § 1303, thereby warranting the exercise of habeas 
jurisdiction.191 
The challenged banishment in Poodry presented a novel question of 
federal Indian law.192 Citing Jones, the Poodry court concluded that 
banishment was a “severe actual or potential restraint on liberty” and 
was therefore sufficient for habeas jurisdiction.193 The Second Circuit 
found that revocation of lifelong citizenship, threats, deprivation of 
electrical service, and unsuccessful attempts to remove tribal members 
from the reservation194 constituted severe restraints on liberty.195 The 
Poodry court even went so far as to say that banishment orders alone, 
“even absent attempts to enforce them,” would be sufficient for habeas 
jurisdiction.196 Thus, the Second Circuit created a categorical rule that 
banishment, when used as a criminal sanction, is sufficient for habeas 
                                                     
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 879 (including, among others, the right to trial, right to counsel, and right to be free 
from “deprivations of liberty and property without due process of law”).  
190. Id.  
191. Id. at 901. 
192. Id. at 879. 
193. Id. at 880; see also discussion supra Part IV.A. (discussing the Jones and Hensley Courts’ 
interpretation of “custody”). The Poodry court also pointed to other circuit courts’ expansive 
interpretations of habeas. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 894 (comparing Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 
F.2d 39, 41–42 (9th Cir. 1975) (modest fine not enough for “custody”), and Harts v. Indiana, 732 
F.2d 95, 96 (7th Cir. 1984) (one-year suspension of driver’s license not enough for “custody”), with 
Dow v. Cir. Ct., 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (fourteen hours of alcohol rehab program enough 
for “custody,” because it required petitioner’s physical presence at a particular place, like Jones and 
Hensley)). 
194. Although the banished tribal members still lived on the reservation, the banishment orders 
allowed the tribe to expel them at any time. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895.  
195. Id. (“We deal here not with a modest fine or a short suspension of a privilege—found not to 
satisfy the custody requirement for habeas relief—but with the coerced and peremptory deprivations 
of the petitioners’ membership in the tribe and their social and cultural affiliation.”). The Poodry 
court also emphasized that petitioners would have no remedy without federal court intervention, id. 
at 885, even though the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones and Hensley did not consider lack of remedy 
as a factor in the jurisdictional analysis.  
196. Id. at 895. 
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jurisdiction under ICRA.197 
Two years after its Poodry decision, the Second Circuit in 
Shenandoah v. U.S. Department of the Interior198 considered whether 
tribal members may challenge their disenrollment under ICRA’s habeas 
provision. Disenrolled tribal members of the Oneida Nation alleged 
various restraints on their liberty, including loss of tribal membership 
and employment, lost tribal benefits like health insurance and access to 
tribal facilities, loss of their tribal “voice,” and alleged harassment due to 
their opposition to the tribe’s attempt to build a hotel and casino.199 
Failing to find a sufficiently severe restraint on liberty, the district court 
dismissed the habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction.200 
Affirming the district court’s dismissal,201 the Second Circuit declined 
to exercise habeas jurisdiction in Shenandoah, finding that tribal 
disenrollment was not a severe restraint on liberty as defined by 
Poodry.202 The Shenandoah court recognized that habeas could be used 
to challenge more than just physical custody,203 but distinguished the 
Shenandoah facts from Poodry.204 In Poodry, the tribe convicted the 
petitioners of treason, permanently banished them, and stripped them of 
their citizenship, lands, Indian names, and all benefits of tribal 
membership205—which the Second Circuit found to be significantly 
more severe than the punishment in Shenandoah.206 The Second Circuit 
drew the line at Shenandoah, finding that banishment, but not 
disenrollment, warrants the exercise of habeas jurisdiction.207 
                                                     
197. See id. The Poodry court found banishment sufficient for habeas jurisdiction, even absent 
attempts to enforce it, because the tribe used it as punishment for alleged crimes. Id. While the 
Poodry court did not call this holding a categorical rule, federal courts since Poodry generally treat 
it as such. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
198. 159 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1998). 
199. Id. at 711, 714. 
200. Id. at 710. 
201. Id. at 714. 
202. Id. at 710, 714. 
203. Id. at 714 (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 893–94, 897 
(2d Cir. 1996)). 
204. See id. (explaining that the plaintiffs in Shenandoah had not “alleged that they were 
banished from the Nation, deprived of tribal membership, convicted of any crime, or that defendants 
attempted in anyway [sic] to remove them from Oneida territory”).  
205. Id. (quoting Poodry, 85 F.3d at 876, 878).  
206. Id. 
207. See id. For a discussion about whether this is a valid distinction, see infra Part VI.D. 
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B. The Ninth Circuit Adopted the Second Circuit’s Reasoning and 
Declined to Exercise Habeas Jurisdiction over a Tribal 
Disenrollment Action 
No other federal circuit court of appeals considered this issue again 
until 2010, when the Ninth Circuit in Jeffredo v. Macarro208 declined to 
exercise habeas jurisdiction over a tribal disenrollment action.209 The 
Ninth Circuit found that the district court properly dismissed the 
disenrolled tribal members’ petition for habeas because they were not 
“detained” within the meaning of § 1303.210 
In Jeffredo, enrollment committee members of the federally 
recognized Pechanga Band of the Luiseño Mission Indians received tips 
that some tribal members were not original Pechanga descendants.211 
After investigating these tips, the enrollment committee determined that 
petitioners did not meet the original lineal descent requirement for tribal 
membership.212 The tribe provided hearings and subsequently 
disenrolled the petitioners.213 Disenrollment meant that petitioners lost 
their tribal citizenship and were denied access to the tribe’s senior 
citizens’ center, health care clinic, and school.214 
The Ninth Circuit relied extensively on the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning and adopted the rule of Poodry and Shenandoah that § 1303 
requires “a severe actual or potential restraint on liberty” to support 
federal habeas jurisdiction.215 The Ninth Circuit found the facts of 
Jeffredo most similar to those in Shenandoah.216 Like in Shenandoah, 
the petitioners in Jeffredo were not banished, nor were they evicted from 
their land, fined, detained, or arrested.217 Neither “the potential threat of 
                                                     
208. 599 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3327.  
209. Id. at 921. 
210. See id. The court also found that petitioners failed to exhaust all tribal remedies available, a 
prerequisite for ICRA habeas jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit. Id. Exhaustion of tribal remedies is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
211. Id. at 915–16. 
212. Id. at 916–17. 
213. Id. at 917. The tribe required a detailed process for disenrollment, including adequate notice 
to the affected member and a meeting where the enrollment committee must show its reason for 
disenrollment. Id. at 916. An appeal can follow, but the tribal member is not entitled to legal 
representation. Id. 
214. Id. at 918–19. 
215. Id. at 919 (quoting Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 
1996)). 
216. See id. 
217. Id.  
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future eviction”218 nor denial of access to certain tribal facilities were 
severe enough restraints on liberty for habeas jurisdiction, based on 
Poodry and Shenandoah.219 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit found that even 
though loss of tribal citizenship seemed categorically unjust,220 a tribe’s 
right to determine its own membership is paramount.221 Guided by its 
lack of jurisdiction over tribal membership decisions and long-standing 
principles of tribal sovereignty, the Ninth Circuit stayed its hand and 
denied the petition for habeas,222 even though “fairness may seem to 
dictate otherwise.”223 
The majority’s refusal to accept loss of citizenship as a severe 
restraint on liberty drew a sharp dissent.224 Because tribes have the 
power to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands,225 Judge Wilken in 
dissent found disenrollment to be the functional equivalent of 
banishment even where the threat of exile is not actualized.226 In Judge 
Wilken’s view, the combined effect of stripped tribal citizenship, denial 
of access to tribal facilities, and potential exclusion from tribal lands is a 
sufficiently severe restraint on liberty to justify habeas jurisdiction.227 
C. Following Poodry and Shenandoah, District Courts Generally 
Exercise Habeas Jurisdiction over Challenges to Banishment, but 
Not Disenrollment 
Since the pair of Second Circuit decisions, lower courts reviewing 
challenges to tribal banishment generally adopt the reasoning of 
Poodry.228 In Quair v. Sisco (Quair I),229 two female tribal members 
                                                     
218. Id. at 920. In the Ninth Circuit, potential jail time for failure to pay a court-imposed fine 
does not justify habeas jurisdiction “until confinement is imminent.” Id. at 919–20 (citing Edmunds 
v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
219. Id. at 919. The Ninth Circuit explained succinctly, “[t]his is not Poodry.” Id. In contrast to 
Jeffredo, petitioners in Poodry “were convicted of treason, sentenced to permanent banishment, and 
permanently lost any and all rights afforded to tribal members.” Id.  
220. See id. at 921 (“[This] case is deeply troubling on the level of fundamental substantive 
justice.” (quoting Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
221. See id. at 920 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 n.32 (1978)); id. at 
921 (“[W]e do not have jurisdiction to review membership decisions.”).  
222. See id. at 920–21. 
223. Id. at 921 (quoting Lewis, 424 F.3d at 963). 
224. Id. at 921–25 (Wilken, J., dissenting). 
225. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
226. See Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 923 (Wilken, J., dissenting). 
227. Id. at 925. 
228. See, e.g., Sweet v. Hinzman (Sweet I), 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2008) 
(“The court adopts the reasoning and holding in the Poodry decision.”); Quair v. Sisco (Quair I), 
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were disenrolled and physically banished from the Santa Rosa Rancheria 
Tachi Tribe for alleged misuse of tribal funds, defamation, and 
undermining the tribal government, among other things.230 Adopting the 
Poodry court’s expansive interpretation of ICRA’s habeas provision, the 
Quair I court found a sufficient restraint on liberty to warrant habeas 
jurisdiction.231 
After the Quair I decision, the Rancheria Tribe held a review hearing 
to reconsider the two tribal members’ disenrollment and banishment.232 
After the tribe affirmed both actions, the women again filed a habeas 
petition in federal district court.233 In Quair II, the court determined that 
habeas jurisdiction was proper for both disenrollment and banishment 
actions, provided they restrict the petitioner’s freedom of movement.234 
Applying this principle, the Quair II court denied habeas jurisdiction 
over the disenrollment because it did not limit petitioners’ physical 
movement under the facts of the case.235 The court also dismissed the 
banishment claim on grounds that the tribe’s rehearing partially mooted 
the case and because petitioners failed to show that their interests in 
procedural safeguards outweighed any countervailing tribal interests.236 
Likewise, in Sweet v. Hinzman,237 a federal district court found a 
sufficient restraint on liberty to exercise habeas jurisdiction when the 
Snoqualmie Tribe banished nine members for their alleged treason in 
                                                     
359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 964 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“There is no question that the most authoritative 
discussion of this issue is that in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians.” (citation omitted)). 
But cf. Alire v. Jackson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 (D. Or. 1999) (finding exclusion not to be a 
severe restraint on liberty where an individual belonging to another tribe was excluded from the 
reservation, but was neither denied any of her own tribe’s benefits nor stripped of her tribal 
citizenship).  
229. 359 F. Supp. 2d 948. 
230. Id. at 962. Like Poodry and Shenandoah, Quair I has received substantial scholarly 
attention. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 17, at 128–35; Eric Reitman, Note, An Argument for the 
Partial Abrogation of Federally Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 
VA. L. REV. 793, 808–16 (2006). 
231. 359 F. Supp. 2d at 971.  
232. Quair v. Sisco (Quair II), No. 1:02-CV-5891, 2007 WL 1490571, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. May 
21, 2007). 
233. Id. at *2. 
234. Id. at *3. 
235. Id. at *4. 
236. Id. 
237. Sweet v. Hinzman (Sweet I), 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (denying a motion to 
dismiss); see also Sweet v. Hinzman (Sweet II), No. C08-844JLR, 2009 WL 1175647 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 30, 2009) (granting habeas petition on denial of due process grounds); Mapes, supra note 23 
(newspaper article discussing the Snoqualmie Tribe banishment controversy). 
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attempting to create an opposition government.238 The petitioners 
asserted that they would lose their tribal identity, tribal lands, and access 
to services like health care and tribal employment.239 Though the court 
acknowledged the importance of tribal self-determination,240 it 
concluded that banishment impinged on the petitioners’ “liberty 
interests” and found habeas jurisdiction to hear their case.241 
As demonstrated in these cases, tribal courts sometimes use 
banishment as a punishment for treason, dissident political views, and 
other purported crimes against the tribe.242 In response, some federal 
courts extend ICRA habeas jurisdiction to the claims of aggrieved tribal 
members banished from their tribes.243 But federal courts simultaneously 
refuse to expand habeas jurisdiction where the tribe only disenrolls a 
tribal member, even when disenrollment means loss of tribal citizenship, 
access to tribal facilities, and eventual exclusion from tribal lands—
similar to banishment.244 
VI. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM EXERCISING 
HABEAS JURISDICTION OVER TRIBAL BANISHMENT 
ACTIONS 
Loss of tribal citizenship and banishment from tribal lands can be 
devastating for tribal members. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that 
being stripped of citizenship is a tremendous loss and can be “a form of 
punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual 
the political existence that was centuries in the development.”245 Though 
                                                     
238. Sweet I, F. Supp. 2d at 1198–99; see also Sweet II, 2009 WL 1175647, at *6. 
239. Sweet I, F. Supp. 2d at 1198. 
240. See Sweet II, 2009 WL 1175647, at *7 (“[T]he court is wary of wading into these waters 
because discretion should be left to the Tribal Council to determine, under the laws and customs of 
the Tribe, who it wishes to place before the general membership for banishment.”). 
241. Id. at *8. The court set aside the full banishment and placed a ninety-day time limit on 
petitioners’ social banishment, at which time the tribe could seek full banishment with procedural 
protections for the petitioners. Id. at *10. 
242. See, e.g., Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 876–78 (2d Cir. 
1996); Sweet I, F. Supp. 2d at 1198–99; Quair v. Sisco (Quair I), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 962 (E.D. 
Cal. 2004); sources cited supra note 20 (news stories discussing recent tribal banishments). 
243. See cases cited supra note 242. 
244. See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3327; Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). 
245. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). However, the Court’s cases addressing loss of 
citizenship cited by courts and parties in banishment cases, like Trop and Klapprott v. United States, 
335 U.S. 601 (1949), are not directly on point. The U.S. Supreme Court finds loss of United States 
citizenship to be a particularly extreme punishment because it leaves an individual stateless. See 
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101–02 (“The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and 
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tribal banishment is inarguably severe, broadly interpreting habeas 
jurisdiction to encompass tribal banishment is problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, it contravenes Indian law canons of construction, which 
direct courts to interpret statutes in favor of tribes. Tribal banishment is 
not a form of custody or detention, even under the Court’s broadest 
interpretation of custody in Jones and Hensley. Second, broad federal 
habeas jurisdiction interferes with tribes’ sovereign right to determine 
their own tribal membership. Lastly, the distinction courts draw between 
disenrollment and banishment is arbitrary. Banishment, like 
disenrollment, is a membership decision over which tribes have 
sovereign authority. Federal courts should follow the reasoning of their 
disenrollment cases and refrain from exercising habeas jurisdiction over 
tribal banishment actions. Refusing to exercise jurisdiction in such 
actions properly protects tribal sovereignty and promotes respect for 
tribal court systems. 
A. Asserting Habeas Jurisdiction over Tribal Banishment Actions 
Impermissibly Broadens U.S. Supreme Court Habeas 
Jurisprudence and Contravenes Indian Law Canons of 
Construction 
Interpreting ICRA’s habeas provision to encompass jurisdiction over 
banishment actions contravenes Indian law canons of construction 
intended to preserve tribal sovereignty.246 These canons direct courts to 
(1) resolve any statutory ambiguities in favor of the tribe,247 (2) interpret 
statutes liberally in favor of the tribe,248 and (3) uphold tribal sovereignty 
unless congressional intent to abrogate it is clear and unambiguous.249 
By interpreting habeas jurisdiction broadly, federal courts contravene all 
three of these canons. 
Congress did not define the scope of ICRA’s habeas provision.250 Nor 
                                                     
international political community.”); id. at 102 (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual 
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.” (emphasis added)). 
Though loss of tribal citizenship can be a significant hardship, it does not leave the individual 
stateless. Native Americans are both tribal citizens and U.S. citizens. See Indian Citizenship Act of 
1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006) (granting citizenship to all Indians and Alaskan Natives born in the 
United States). Though these U.S. Supreme Court cases are useful for considering the effects of loss 
of citizenship, they are not on point. 
246. See generally discussion supra Part I.B. (discussing Indian law canons of construction). 
247. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). 
248. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). 
249. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1978). 
250. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006); see also supra Part IV.B. 
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has the U.S. Supreme Court, except to say that it is the only federal 
remedy available for ICRA violations.251 Given this statutory ambiguity, 
courts should construe the statute liberally in favor of the tribe, which 
means interpreting habeas narrowly.252 Lower federal courts have 
properly concluded that the term “detention” in ICRA’s habeas 
provision has an identical meaning to “custody” in other federal habeas 
statutes.253 Indeed, Indian law canons of construction dictate that 
“detention” be interpreted coterminously with “custody,” because 
interpreting “detention” to be broader than “custody” cuts against tribal 
sovereignty.254 Thus, federal courts must apply U.S. Supreme Court 
interpretations of “custody” and the attendant scope of habeas 
jurisdiction to ICRA habeas petitions. 
The Court’s most generous construction of “custody” comes from 
Jones and Hensley.255 Under the test developed in those cases, courts 
must look to whether there are “severe restraints on individual 
liberty.”256 Though an individual need not be physically incarcerated to 
be in “custody” for habeas jurisdiction, the restraints on liberty must be 
both severe and immediate.257 For instance, parole constitutes “custody” 
because it involves actual restraints on movement plus the real threat of 
incarceration in the event of any parole violations, as in Jones.258 The 
same is true where petitioners are released on their own recognizance 
pending appeal of a criminal conviction, as in Hensley.259 As with 
parole, release on one’s own recognizance means that an individual’s 
freedom “rests in the hands of state judicial officers”260 and jail time 
may be imminent.261 Thus, under the Court’s broadest interpretation, 
                                                     
251. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 69–70. 
252. See cases cited supra notes 247–249.  
253. See supra Part IV.B. (discussing how lower federal courts have compared ICRA’s habeas 
provision to other federal habeas statutes).  
254. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (recognizing that courts must 
construe statutes liberally in favor of the tribes). 
255. See supra text accompanying notes 154–170 (discussing Jones and Hensley). 
256. Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973); accord Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 
242 (1963) (describing “significant restraints” on parolee’s liberty). 
257. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351; accord id. at 346–47 (holding that an individual released on his 
own recognizance was subjected to sufficient immediate restraints on liberty for habeas 
jurisdiction); Jones, 371 U.S. at 242 (holding that parole imposed sufficient immediate restraints for 
habeas jurisdiction). 
258. Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. 
259. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 346–47. 
260. Id. at 351. 
261. Id. at 348. 
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“custody” requires (1) actual restraints on freedom of movement and (2) 
the real, as opposed to speculative, possibility of incarceration as a 
consequence of any misstep.262 
Neither banishment nor disenrollment constitutes custody within the 
Court’s broadest habeas jurisprudence. Banishment does not entail 
imminent incarceration like the parole or release on one’s own 
recognizance situations at issue in Jones and Hensley.263 Once tribal 
members are banished, they are free to go anywhere they please except 
tribal lands. While banishment is a more significant restraint than those 
experienced by other tribal members, it is no greater than restraints on 
other nonmembers,264 who may be excluded from tribal lands. More 
significantly, banishment is unlike parole, where the parolee is subject to 
continuing restrictions and any violation means jail time. Banishment is 
similarly unlike being released on bail, because banishment imposes no 
affirmative obligation to appear at a given time at the tribe’s behest or 
else be returned to jail. Essentially, banishment does not impose any 
real—or even speculative—possibility of incarceration. Therefore, 
finding habeas jurisdiction for tribal banishment goes beyond Jones and 
Hensley’s holdings. Binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent and 
deference to tribal sovereignty require that courts decline habeas 
jurisdiction over banishment actions. Narrow habeas jurisdiction best 
protects tribal sovereignty and the integrity of tribal court systems.265 
Lastly, congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty is not clear 
                                                     
262. See, e.g., id. (“His incarceration is not, in other words, a speculative possibility that depends 
on a number of contingencies over which he has no control.”). 
263. Furthermore, the Second Circuit in Poodry took the U.S. Supreme Court’s “severe restraint 
on individual liberty” language and added potential restraints on liberty, impermissibly expanding 
habeas jurisdiction. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880, 895 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (holding that habeas jurisdiction is proper where there is a “severe actual or potential 
restraint on liberty” (emphasis added)); see also Kunesh, supra note 17, at 123 (arguing that the 
court’s holding in Poodry “extends far beyond federal habeas corpus jurisprudence,” particularly 
because “it reaches to potential and threatened restraints on an individual’s liberty rather than 
limiting it to actual restraints under the U.S. Supreme Court’s detention analysis”). Neither 
threatened nor actual banishment fit within the scope of ICRA’s habeas jurisdiction. Finding a 
future potential restraint sufficient for habeas jurisdiction further contravenes the requirement that a 
restraint be immediate. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351. The Poodry court’s unprecedented extension of 
Jones and Hensley raises the question when a potential restraint will be immediate or severe enough 
to permit habeas jurisdiction.  
264. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (explaining that restraints on the petitioner must 
be compared to restraints on society at large). Only when a habeas petitioner is subject to much 
more severe restraints on liberty than society at large should courts exercise habeas jurisdiction. See 
supra note 170.  
265. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980) (“Ambiguities 
in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with these traditional notions of 
sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.”). 
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and unambiguous. Although ICRA’s habeas provision partially 
abrogates tribal sovereignty,266 it is a very limited abrogation because 
individuals may only challenge their tribal detention or custody within 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s broadest construction of the term. On the other 
hand, ICRA’s legislative history demonstrates clear and unambiguous 
congressional intent to provide only one limited remedy in order to 
protect tribal sovereignty.267 Courts must not apply the habeas remedy in 
a manner that frustrates ICRA’s fundamental purposes or violates Indian 
law canons of construction.268 
B. Expansive Habeas Jurisdiction Disturbs the Careful Balance 
Struck by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court Between 
Individual Rights and Tribal Sovereignty and Violates Tribes’ 
Right to Determine Their Own Membership 
In addition to violating Indian law canons of construction, broadly 
interpreting ICRA’s habeas provision disturbs the careful balance struck 
by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court between protecting individual 
tribal members and promoting tribal sovereignty. Federal policy at the 
time of ICRA’s enactment supported tribal self-governance.269 Against 
this historical backdrop, Congress considered and rejected several 
proposals for expansive federal jurisdiction to review tribal court 
decisions.270 Instead, Congress deliberately chose the narrow habeas 
remedy, which limits federal intrusion into tribal affairs.271 
Furthermore, since enacting ICRA, Congress has consistently 
                                                     
266. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining that ICRA is considered to be a 
partial abrogation of tribal sovereignty because it imposes affirmative obligations on tribes to 
protect individual rights). ICRA is not considered to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, however. 
Tribes are generally immune from suit in state and federal courts. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. 
However, habeas is not considered to be a suit against the sovereign, but rather a suit against an 
individual custodian, like a prison warden. Id. at 59 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243). As a result, 
traditional principles of tribal sovereign immunity do not come into play in ICRA habeas cases. See 
id. at 59. 
267.  See supra Part II (discussing ICRA’s historical context, text, and legislative history). 
Similarly, other provisions of ICRA serve to protect tribal sovereignty rather than abrogate it. See 
supra note 89.  
268. See supra Part I.B. (explaining that Indian law canons of construction require deference to 
tribal sovereignty). 
269. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (discussing federal policy of tribal self-
determination). 
270. See supra text accompanying notes 94–102 (discussing original ICRA bill’s rejection of de 
novo and Attorney General forms of federal review). 
271. See supra text accompanying notes 90–102; see also Martinez, 436 U.S. at 69–70. 
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promoted tribal sovereignty272 and declined to expand federal 
jurisdiction over ICRA claims.273 Congress twice amended ICRA to 
increase maximum tribal imprisonment for violations of tribal law: from 
six months to one year in 1986,274 then from one year to three years with 
up to nine years of stackable sentences in 2010 for repeat offenders.275 
These amendments increase tribal authority to prosecute crimes 
committed by both member and nonmember Indians.276 Similarly, 
Congress treats tribal courts, not federal courts, as the ultimate arbiters 
of ICRA’s substantive provisions.277 The 1991 congressional report on 
ICRA’s impact emphasized that increased funding and support for tribal 
courts, not increased federal jurisdiction over tribal actions, was the best 
way to remedy ICRA violations.278 Congress affirmed this finding when 
it passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act in 1993,279 which aimed to 
strengthen tribal court systems through additional funding and 
training.280 Federal courts should follow this cue and refrain from 
expanding jurisdiction where Congress has so consistently acted to 
augment tribal sovereignty.281 
Furthermore, when federal courts exercise habeas jurisdiction over 
tribal membership decisions, they contradict one of Santa Clara Pueblo 
                                                     
272. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (recognizing the 
“firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development”). 
273. See supra notes 103–109 and accompanying text (discussing congressional report 
advocating for increased tribal court funding, as well as a failed Senate bill that would have 
abrogated tribal sovereign immunity in federal court for civil violations of ICRA). 
274. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1986)). 
275. Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258, 2279 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D), (b) 
(Supp. IV 2010)). The most recent 2010 amendment allowing for up to nine years of stackable 
sentences may decrease the need for tribes to impose banishment to solve the problem of repeat 
offenders. See id. (permitting up to three years imprisonment for a tribal member who “has been 
previously convicted of the same or a comparable offense”). 
276. See supra note 1 (discussing tribal authority to prosecute both member and nonmember 
Indians).  
277. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3621 (2006); cf. 1991 ICRA REPORT, supra note 103, at 71–72, 74. 
This Report essentially defers to the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in Martinez that tribal courts 
are to be the ultimate arbiters of ICRA, not federal courts. See id.; see also Martinez, 436 U.S. at 
65–66. 
278. See 1991 ICRA REPORT, supra note 103, at 69–72, 74.  
279. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601–3621). 
280. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601(2)–(4) (affirming the importance of tribal “self-determination, self-
reliance,” and “inherent authority to establish their own form of government, including tribal justice 
systems”).  
281. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 n.13 (1979) (finding ICRA’s “legislative 
history indicative of an intent to limit severely judicial interference in tribal affairs”); cf. Martinez, 
436 U.S. at 58–59 (emphasizing that congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty must be 
clear and unequivocal before subjecting tribes to suit). 
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v. Martinez’s core principles.282 There, the Court stated emphatically that 
a tribe’s membership decisions are “central” to its self-government and 
“existence as an independent political community.”283 Expanding habeas 
jurisdiction to encompass banishment actions vitiates a tribe’s sovereign 
right to determine its own membership. Where Congress has not 
explicitly regulated tribal membership decisions, courts should not 
presume abrogation of tribes’ power to make such determinations.284 
C. The Line Drawn Between Banishment and Disenrollment Is 
Arbitrary Because Tribes Have Authority to Exclude Nonmembers 
from Tribal Lands 
Both disenrollment and banishment are forms of tribal membership 
decisions, because both are essentially determinations of who may 
participate in tribal life.285 Banishment involves formally expelling a 
tribal member from tribal lands.286 Disenrollment involves stripping an 
individual of tribal membership.287 Historically, tribal banishment did 
not always include loss of tribal citizenship,288 but modern banishment 
usually does. Despite the traditional distinction between banishment and 
disenrollment, today they are often functionally equivalent. Because 
tribes may exclude nonmember individuals from tribal lands,289 
disenrolled individuals are subject to the exclusionary authority, just like 
banished tribal members. Receipt of federal tribal membership 
                                                     
282. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32 (finding tribal membership decisions essential for tribal 
self-government).  
283. Id. 
284. See id. (“Given the often vast gulf between tribal traditions and those with which federal 
courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action that 
would intrude on these delicate matters.”). 
285. See Nicole J. Laughlin, Identity Crisis: An Examination of Federal Infringement on Tribal 
Autonomy to Determine Membership, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 97, 120 (2007) (“It is not reasonable to 
conclude that tribes are the gatekeepers of membership, but at the same time do not have the 
authority to exile those who are not fulfilling their duties as tribal members.”); Brendan Ludwick, 
The Scope of Federal Authority over Tribal Membership Disputes and the Problem of 
Disenrollment, 51 FED. LAW. 37, 39 (2004) (“Banishment is closely tied to tribal membership 
because the punishment suggests that the banished individual is no longer part of the tribe.”). 
286. See, e.g., Poodry, 85 F.3d at 878; Quair v. Sisco (Quair I), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 961–62 
(E.D. Cal. 2004); sources cited supra note 19 (tribal banishment codes); sources cited supra note 20 
(newspaper articles discussing tribal banishment). 
287. See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 916–17 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3327; Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998); sources cited 
supra note 27 (sources discussing tribal disenrollment). 
288. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
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benefits290 is also dependent upon tribal enrollment, so both banishment 
and disenrollment can result in similar denial of such benefits. 
As a result, the distinction between disenrollment and banishment is 
not as stark as the Second Circuit asserted in Shenandoah.291 There, the 
petitioners were stricken from the membership rolls, though not formally 
banished.292 In contrast, the Poodry petitioners were technically 
banished from tribal lands, but not actually forced to leave.293 Petitioners 
in all three circuit court cases—Poodry, Shenandoah, and Jeffredo—lost 
their tribal citizenship and many benefits of tribal membership, including 
access to tribal facilities.294 Furthermore, the petitioners in all three also 
faced a real threat of physical removal from tribal lands, regardless of 
whether they were banished or disenrolled.295 Despite these 
commonalities, only the threat of physical banishment in Poodry was 
sufficient for habeas jurisdiction,296 while potential physical exclusion 
from tribal lands after disenrollment in Shenandoah and Jeffredo was 
not.297 In the end, the semantic distinction between “disenrolled” and 
“banished” proved dispositive for ICRA habeas jurisdiction. 
Even where courts attempt to draw less arbitrary distinctions, the 
result is the same. In Quair II, the district court explained that it would 
have habeas jurisdiction over disenrollment actions that restricted the 
                                                     
290. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 
(2006); Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006); Native American 
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, 25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2006). 
291. See Shenandoah, 159 F.3d at 714. 
292. See id. 
293. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 877–78 (2d Cir. 1996). 
294. Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 919–20 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3327; 
Shenandoah, 159 F.3d at 714; Poodry, 85 F.3d at 878. 
295. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (discussing tribal exclusionary authority over 
nonmembers). Furthermore, the hardship suffered by banished and disenrolled tribal members may 
be equally significant. See Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 921–25 (Wilken, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
hardship of loss of tribal citizenship, whether via disenrollment or banishment). 
296. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895. 
297. Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 919–20; Shenandoah, 159 F.3d at 714. Compare Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 
920 (declining habeas jurisdiction when there is only a “potential threat of future eviction” 
(emphasis added)), with Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880 (exercising habeas jurisdiction when there is a 
“severe actual or potential restraint on liberty” (emphasis added)). The Ninth Circuit has not 
reviewed a banishment action like the Second Circuit in Poodry. However, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted Poodry and Shenandoah’s reasoning in declining habeas jurisdiction over a tribal 
disenrollment action. Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 919 (“We agree with our colleagues on the Second 
Circuit and hold that § 1303 does require a ‘severe actual or potential restraint on liberty.’” (quoting 
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880)). Because the Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning for a 
disenrollment case similar to Shenandoah, it seems likely that it would follow Poodry in a 
banishment case.  
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petitioners’ physical movements.298 However, with tribal exclusionary 
authority, both banishment and disenrollment may involve physical 
exclusion from tribal lands. On the other hand, both banishment and 
disenrollment may present no actual, immediate restraints on movement, 
as demonstrated in Poodry.299 Attempting to distinguish categorically 
between disenrollment and banishment is also problematic because these 
actions arise in a wide variety of circumstances,300 often because of 
intratribal disputes. Either may be a punishment for political 
opposition,301 troublemaking,302 drug abuse,303 improper lineal 
descent,304 treason,305 or other perceived violations of tribal unity. Some 
of these are treated as legitimate (Jeffredo) and others illegitimate 
(Poodry) reasons for exclusion from the tribe. However, even 
perceptibly legitimate reasons for exclusion from a tribe may be the 
result of tribal corruption.306 In either case, federal courts should not rush 
to interfere with these disputes in light of tribes’ broad authority to self-
govern in addition to congressional and U.S. Supreme Court deference 
to tribal sovereignty. A tribe’s sovereign right to determine its 
membership dictates that federal courts refuse to review such actions. 
                                                     
298. See Quair v. Sisco (Quair II), No. 1:02-CV-5891, 2007 WL 1490571, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 
21, 2007). 
299. See Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895. Further confusing disenrollment and banishment is the issue of 
exclusion. In Alire v. Jackson, a federal district court declined to find habeas jurisdiction for tribal 
exclusion, which it labeled as banishment. 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 (D. Or. 1999). In that case, a 
member of the Shoshone-Paiute Tribe was excluded from another tribe’s lands for tribal ordinance 
violations. Id. at 1125. The district court distinguished this exclusion from Poodry by emphasizing 
that the petitioner had not been stripped of her tribal citizenship or Indian name, or excluded from 
her own tribal lands. Id. at 1129. The Alire court seemingly treated loss of citizenship as a necessary 
element for habeas jurisdiction over a tribal banishment action. Id. But see Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 
920–21 (holding that loss of tribal citizenship is not enough for federal habeas jurisdiction). 
300. See, e.g., Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 915–16 (tribal lineal descent); Shenandoah, 159 F.3d at 711 
(opposition to tribal development); Poodry, 85 F.3d at 877–78 (treason). 
301. E.g., Shenandoah, 159 F.3d at 711; Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198–99 
(W.D. Wash. 2008); Quair v. Sisco (Quair I), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 962 (E.D. Cal. 2004); see also 
Cooper, supra note 27 (presenting a different explanation for the Pechanga Tribe disenrollments in 
Jeffredo: that tribal members who opposed casino expansion deals were subsequently disenrolled 
for sham reasons, like lack of lineal descent).  
302. E.g., Alire v. Jackson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1125 (D. Or. 1999); sources cited supra note 20 
(recent news stories about tribal banishment). 
303. E.g., sources cited supra note 20. 
304. Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 915–16. 
305. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 876–78. 
306. See Cooper, supra note 27 (discussing recent disenrollments from the Pechanga Tribe—the 
disenrollments at issue in Jeffredo—due to tribal gaming corruption).  
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CONCLUSION 
The struggle for tribal sovereignty has defined the relationship 
between tribes and the federal government. Though the devastating 
termination era is fortunately over, the struggle for tribal sovereignty 
continues. Congress has acted in a number of positive ways to increase 
recognition of tribal sovereignty and support development of robust 
tribal governments. Though ICRA imposes affirmative obligations on 
tribes, Congress nonetheless acted carefully to prevent federal courts 
from unnecessarily intruding on tribal affairs and governance. Both 
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have since affirmed this balance 
and accorded special solicitude to tribal sovereignty. Though still 
underfunded, tribal justice systems need freedom to develop according 
to tribal traditions and customs without undue interference from federal 
courts. 
Declining federal jurisdiction in these cases may result in isolated 
incidents where individuals banished from their tribal lands or stripped 
of their lifelong tribal citizenship are left without a remedy. However, 
the supremacy of tribal sovereignty sometimes dictates such a result: 
[E]ven if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in denying 
an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, 
such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because it is 
intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by 
furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government.307 
Federal courts demonstrate respect for tribal systems when they 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over banishment cases. Refusing to 
exercise jurisdiction properly preserves the appropriate balance between 
ICRA’s protection of individual tribal member rights and its deference to 
sovereign tribal governments. 
 
                                                     
307. Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976). 
